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Historically the Food and Drug Administration has not regulated human tis-
sues for transplantation, but with the pervasive scourge of AIDS and widespread
public concern about preventing its transmission, pressure has mounted on the
government to introduce more specic regulatory controls over the tissue in-
dustry. This paper will document the development since 1990 of the movement
to achieve such controls, by examining Congressional legislation, FDA activity,
testimony of important gures involved in the debate, and industry trends. The
discussion will be conned for the most part to human tissue as distinct from
blood or organs, upon which exhaustive research would be beyond the scope of
this eort.
What changed?
Over the last fteen years, three important developments in the use
of human tissue for transplantation laid the groundwork for what would be-
come the movement for more direct comprehensive governmental regulation in
the area. The rst was a technological explosion. When technology was less
advanced, the only medically viable options for tissue transplantation were re-
covery of fresh human tissue for immediate use in a patient in need, with little
or no processing. In those cases the questions about potential harm from han-
dling, processing, or chemical contamination were few. Advances in chemical
technology and cryopreservation, however, permitted groundbreaking treatment
of tissues in order to preserve them for longer time periods and thereby intro-
duced new concerns about contamination, deterioration, and ecacy.
1The technological advances in turn spawned another explosion - this
time a commercial one. As preservation technology spread, so did new stor-
age and transportation techniques. Distribution of tissues, previously handled
only locally, soon expanded into nationwide networks of tissue banks capable of
storing tissues for long time periods and delivering them in short order. Tissue
banking became a popular, lucrative, national proposition.
At the same time tissue banking expanded during the 1980s, no health
issue was of more public importance or interest than the spread of HIV/AIDS.
The American public came to view the disease as of epidemic proportions, and
the rapidity with which government and private institutions sought to educate
society about the disease was unprecedented in modern times and continues
today.
Together, these three developments created fertile territory for a po-
tential groundswell of public and legislative interest in heightened governmental
regulation of the tissue banking industry. By the early 1990s the federal gov-
ernment was indeed enforcing some regulation under the 1976 Medical Device
Amendments, but it was non-comprehensive, \pick-and-choose" regulation of
only certain types of tissues, namely dura mater (brous tissue surrounding the
brain and spinal cord), corneal lenticules, and heart valves. And as is the case
with most movements for governmental change, the potential forces described
above were by themselves insucient to eect more comprehensive regulation -
they needed a catalyst.
Three events catalyzed the momentum for Congressional re-examination of
2regulating the human tissue industry. The rst was the devastating discovery
in 1991 that Mr. William Norwood, an organ and tissue donor who had been
fatally shot in a 1985 gas station holdup, was HIV-positive. Fifty-eight individ-
uals received organs and tissues from Mr. Norwood; three patients who received
organs from him died from AIDS-related conditions, and three who received tis-
sue grafts tested HIV-positive.1
The second event was a 1991 FDA Notice of Applicability of a Final Rule
(NAFR)2 issued to clarify that heart valve allografts were to be considered
Class III medical devices for regulatory purposes. In short, the FDA decided
to regulate heart valve allografts exactly as it was already regulating replace-
ment heart valves. Such valves (and with the 1991 regulation, allografts as
well) were subject to a 1987 FDA rule requiring ling of a premarket approval
application (PMA).3 Classication of replacement heart valves is found at 21
C.F.R. x870.3925(a), and the regulation concluded that replacement heart valve
allografts \squarely t within the agency's classication regulation...."4 Fur-
ther, FDA concluded that any distribution of the allografts was to be under an
investigational device exemption (IDE) for signicant risk devices.5
The third catalyzing event was a Seventh Circuit decision supporting the
FDA regulation. In Alabama Tissue Center v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373 (7th Cir.
1Tracy Walmer, Virginia Community Tries to Make Sense of AIDS Donor Mystery, USA
Today, May 22, 1991, at 2A.
256 Fed. Reg. 29,177 (1991).
352 Fed. Reg. 18,162 (1987).
456 Fed. Reg. 29,177, 29,178 (1991).
5Id.
31992), six tissue banks asked the court to overturn the FDA's rule classifying
human heart valves as medical devices, but the court dismissed the petition.
The tissue banks felt that compulsory ling of IDEs for allograft heart valves
which had already been used successfully in thousands of patients over several
years was an unreasonable mandate. The court held that since the FDA as-
sumed authority over the valves in a Notice of Applicability of a Final Rule, an
interpretative rule and not a regulation, such FDA action was not subject to
appellate review.6
The Human Tissue Transplantation Act of 1992
This chain of events prompted Congressional action. On June 29, 1992 Sen-
ator Paul Simon of Illinois introduced the Human Tissue Transplantation Act of
1992.7 The bill failed to pass, but as the rst explicit proposal of direct federal
regulation of human tissue, its content as well as the testimony of several key
gures at a hearing to consider it revealed important arguments that continue
to dene the debate in this area.
The bill proposed several new means of regulation. It imposed a licensing
scheme for tissue banks as well as creation of a National Council on Tissue
Transplantation.8 The Council was to be a nonprot entity whose duties in-
cluded collection, analysis, and dissemination of data concerning human tissue
donation and transplants, increasing availability of tissue types in short supply,
6Alabama Tissue Center v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 379 (1992).
7S. 2908, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
8Id. x 355.
4development of uniform record-keeping methods, and development of voluntary
professional standards to assure that donated human tissue would not transmit
disease.9 The bill also authorized inspections of tissue banks to ensure con-
formance with licensing requirements10 and provided that if the Secretary (of
Health and Human Services) found the voluntary standards developed by the
Council for a particular tissue to be inadequate, then he would be authorized to
establish a public standard for the tissue.11 The public standard would include
provisions applying to the processing, physical and biological properties, and la-
beling for each tissue type.12 Finally, enforcement options for various violations
included civil penalties ranging from $10,000 to $50,000 per violation, license
suspension, and seizure of human tissue violative of the standard.13
Following introduction of the bill in the Senate, a hearing was held on Septem-
ber 29, 1992 before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. In his
opening statement at that hearing, Committee Chairman and Senate Bill 2908
sponsor Senator Simon noted the absence of any national tissue standards or
tissue bank oversight, and dismissed the June 1991 FDA action as \regulatory
overkill."14 Next the Senator mentioned the three general principles he had in
mind in drafting the legislation:
First, both the tissue bank community and the federal government have
the responsibility to the public to assure the safety of human tissue. Second,
human tissue should not be regulated as if it is an articial product designed by
9Id.
10Id. x 357.
11Id. x 358.
12Id.
13Id. x 359.
14Regulation of Human Tissue Transplantation: Hearing on S. 2908 Before the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992) (statement of Sen. Paul Simon).
5human beings. And third, the regulation of human tissue should be by a single
regulatory mechanism developed either through statute or by an agreement
among the FDA and the transplantation community.15
FDA Deputy Commissioner for Policy Michael R. Taylor then testied to
the FDA's position on Senate Bill 2908 and on generally what should be ad-
dressed in devising a tissue regulation scheme. While ultimately concluding that
Senate Bill 2908 was not comprehensive enough to win the FDA's full support,
Mr. Taylor nevertheless praised Congressional interest and eort in the area of
human tissue regulation and made some important statements regarding FDA's
position on the issue.
First, he mentioned the recommendation of a 1991 Public Health Service
(PHS) task force (organized after the Norwood incident, see supra p. 2) that
the FDA establish at least a mandatory oor of requiring registration of tissue
banks, setting donor screening criteria, and establishing record-keeping mea-
sures to track tissues.16 Mr. Taylor said that the FDA found the safety-related
measures recommended by PHS to be \an appropriate part of any new Federal
regulatory scheme for tissues," but hedged, adding that any regulatory oor
must be considered \in the context of the broader set of safety, eectiveness,
and resource issues...."17
Second, Mr. Taylor touched on the history of FDA regulation in the
15Id.
16Regulation of Human Tissue Transplantation: Hearing on S. 2908 Before the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992) (statement of Michael R.
Taylor, FDA Deputy Commissioner for Policy).
17Id.
6area, specically referring to heart valve allografts, and described the costs
and benets of FDA regulatory controls in general. He noted in particular the
dicult and disruptive eect that imposition of FDA regulation has had on
products with well-established therapeutic roles. The benets of standardiza-
tion and medical safety notwithstanding, he argued, any eciency calculus must
take into account the twin goals of safety and continued access to critical life
saving tissue. He also noted the special diculty of retrospective application of
a new federal standard to the numerous already-functioning tissue banks in the
United States.18
In summarizing FDA's position, he outlined three broad questions that
continue to dene the tissue regulation debate:
First, is there a need for a comprehensive Federal program instead of the
case-by-case application of FDA's medical device or biologics authority? If there
is a need, should it be addressed under current law or through new legislation
tailored to tissues? And nally, what are the appropriate elements for a regu-
latory scheme for tissues?19
To the rst question Mr. Taylor answered that the public health concern is
one possible justication for a more comprehensive federal program, but that
the FDA was continuing to examine the \full array" of public health issues be-
fore it.20 In essence, then, to this rst important question the FDA's answer
was only that it had not yet determined whether there was a need for compre-
hensive federal regulation.
To the second question, he explained that the FDA's position was that it had
authority \under the Public Health Service Act and the Food and Drug Act,
18Id. at 6.
19Id.
20Id. at 7.
7to mount just about any regulatory intervention one might reasonably consider
appropriate." He continued, however, to note the growing suggestion that tis-
sues are suciently dierent from medical devices to warrant specially tailored
legislation, and hinted that the FDA was leaning toward this conclusion, assum-
ing it were determined that a need for comprehensive federal regulation existed
at all.21
To the third and nal question of what the FDA deemed would comprise an
appropriate regulatory scheme, Mr. Taylor's answer emphasized that any ac-
ceptable scheme would have to be exible, but that it must address the following
at a minimum: safety; standards to assure product quality; administrative treat-
ment of new processes and tissue uses; involvement of private standard setting
and oversight bodies; and enforcement. He cited in particular the failure of Sen-
ate Bill 2908 to address the third of these concerns, namely the establishment
of safety and eectiveness criteria for new medical technologies.22
Dr. S. Randolph May, National Head of Tissue Services for the Amer-
ican Red Cross, also testied to the Committee. After briey recounting the
horrors of the Norwood tragedy, he emphasized that the voluntary regulation
that governed the tissue banking industry, while helping somewhat to provide
safe, quality tissue, was in the aftermath of Norwood clearly inadequate. He
then made a powerful plea on behalf of the Red Cross for swift and strong
Congressional action:
21Id.
22Id.
8The American Red Cross feels strongly that mandatory, enforceable stan-
dards are needed to assure the safety of the people who depend upon trans-
plantable human tissue to sustain or improve the quality of their lives. ...The
American Red Cross urges Congress to establish a public law that requires en-
forceable regulations with the aim of preventing the transmission of diseases
such as AIDS and hepatitis through tissue transplantation.23
The last major gure to testify was one from within the tissue banking in-
dustry itself, Dr. Charles Cuono, President of the American Association of
Tissue Banks (AATB). He announced three principles the AATB found funda-
mental to any regulatory scheme: compulsory registration of all tissue banks,
establishment of uniform donor screening criteria, and establishment of a track-
ing system. He concluded that Senate Bill 2908 failed to adequately address
these issues, primarily due to its reliance on the National Council on Tissue
Transplantation and voluntary professional standards. Further, he argued that
Senate Bill 2908 would only duplicate (at taxpayer expense) the existing volun-
tary system of the AATB.24
Taken together, Senate Bill 2908 and the testimony of these three
critical \players" revealed some noteworthy trends. First, all agreed that the
concern of paramount importance was safety. Exactly how to assure it was the
problem, but agreement on its primacy as a goal is nonetheless important. Sec-
ond, all agreed that some uniformity of standards would be desirable - whether
it should be achieved via voluntary or compulsory standards was contested -
23Regulation of Human Tissue Transplantation: Hearing on S. 2908 Before the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 15 (1992) (statement of S. Randolph
May, National Head of Tissue Services, American Red Cross).
24Regulation of Human Tissue Transplantation: Hearing on S. 2908 Before the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1992) (statement of Charles B.
Cuono, President, American Association of Tissue Banks).
9but again, this was only a rst step in public discourse. Finally, all agreed that
a uniform record-keeping and tracking system should be established. All told,
this was a substantial zone of agreement, especially considering Senate Bill 2908
was the rst Congressional attempt at direct legislation of the tissue industry.
It was perhaps this generally favorable response that prompted Senator Simon
and others to try again in 1993.
Round II: The 1993 Hearings
On October 15, 1993, Representative Ron Wyden of Oregon chaired
a subcommittee hearing on the regulation of human tissue banks. Around two
weeks before the hearing, however, the subcommittee sta prepared an impor-
tant memorandum for Representative Wyden concerning human tissue regula-
tion. The memorandum was the result of a two-year long investigation commis-
sioned by Representative Wyden to inquire into \the safety and eectiveness of
non-organ human tissues which are harvested and processed for transplantation
purposes."25
In conducting their inquiry, the subcommittee sta met with govern-
ment ocials as well as representatives from private companies (both for-prot
and non-prot), and visited several tissue processing and storage facilities. Their
conclusions were similar to those of the witnesses at the 1992 hearings: rst,
though the human tissue network seemed relatively disease-free, contaminated
tissue remained a threat to public health. This, they concluded, was largely
due to poor record-keeping, faulty testing, and inconsistent standards. Second,
25Staff of Subcomm. On Regulation, Business Opportunities and Technology of
the House Comm. On Small Business, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., Memorandum on the
Regulation of Human Tissue for Transplant (1993).
10assuring eectiveness of tissue (aside from disease contamination) that might
undergo varying chemical and cryogenic preservation techniques was woefully
unaddressed, again due to the paucity of widely-accepted industry standards.
Third, they noted the acknowledgment of public health agencies, including the
FDA, that then-current regulatory methods were \inadequate, outdated, and
often in conict."26 Finally, they recommended a mandatory program with the
following now-familiar elements at a minimum: registration of all tissue banks;
uniform tissue banking practices (including testing and processing standards);
and tracking methods to trace tissue from donor to recipient.27
At the hearing on October 15, 1993 several of the witnesses from the
1992 hearing were present again. But unlike Senator Simon, Representative
Wyden included some powerful rhetoric in his opening statement arguing for
the need for regulatory change:
It is time to stop gambling against the odds when health ocials fail to test
tissue. The transmission of HIV, Hepatitis-C and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has
dealt a painful blow to the safety reputation of tissue transplants.
It's unacceptable that the U.S. health system cannot locate infected
patients because tissue has not been tracked.
Inadequate donor screening is unfair to patients. ...Our government
has learned tragic safety lessons about the need to stop the spread of infectious
disease through preventive measures.28
He then unleashed an assault on the inadequacy of then-current federal pol-
icy, attacking regulation of corneas, heart valves and dura mater as an ineective
patchwork resulting in \a regulatory brake on needed research and development
26Id.
27Id.
28Regulation of Human Tissue Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Busi-
ness Opportunities and Technology of the House Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden).
11in the industry."29
Testifying on behalf of the FDA this time was Dr. Kathryn Zoon, Director of
the FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). Her testimony
was in many respects similar to that of Mr. Taylor in 1992, but it also revealed
some important new FDA input. Areas of similarity included a conviction that
infectious disease transmission and eectiveness of preserved donated tissue were
of paramount concern, and that establishment of uniform standards would help
minimize their associated risks. She also echoed Mr. Taylor's emphasis on the
need for eective enforcement, but unlike him explicitly stated a need to rely
less on product specic, case-by-case approvals and more on generally acceptable
uniform public standards.30
Dr. Zoon also announced several new issues that the FDA considered criti-
cal. First, she urged that any legislation must address resources and funding for
a new regulatory eort and argued that user fees should bear the majority of the
cost.31 Second, more than any witness at previous hearings, she addressed the
eects rapid commercialization was having on the industry and on the need to
regulate. She argued that tissue banks' frequent exaggeration of tissue product
benets and failure to provide balanced risk information in promotional mate-
29Id.
30See Regulation of Human Tissue Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation,
Business Opportunities and Technology of the House Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Kathryn Zoon, Director, FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research).
31See id.: \The standard setting and other functions of a federal oversight program would
provide real value to the tissue banking community in terms of public credibility and a level
playing eld, and it is fair to ask that community to bear the cost."
12rials necessitated FDA monitoring of not only advertising and promotion, but
also of labeling. Third, she emphasized the practical reality of the need to main-
tain altruistic donation of human tissue. By assuring the safety and reliability
of tissue, she argued, federal regulatory oversight would encourage altruism by
making people more condent about the usefulness of their donated tissue.32
Dr. May once again testied on behalf of the Red Cross, reiterating its
position strongly favoring the imposition of federal standards and enforcement.
He favored a system of mandatory registration and licensing of tissue banks,
establishment of tissue-specic donor screening procedures, and development of
an eective tracking system.33
The AATB was once again represented at the hearing, this time by
Dr. D. Ted Eastlund. He acknowledged that despite general success of the
voluntary standards his organization imposed, federal oversight would provide
needed enforcement power and uniformity. The AATB, like the Red Cross and
the FDA, supported registration of tissue banks, uniform donor screening and
tissue standards, and a nationwide tracking scheme. Unlike the FDA, however,
(and not surprisingly) the AATB did not support funding the regulatory pro-
gram with user fees - Dr. Eastlund warned that tissue banks could not absorb
such costs without passing them on to patients in need of the tissues. Finally,
the AATB argued for exemption from premarket approval for tissues already in
common use, and more specically for the deletion of human heart valves from
32See id.
33See Regulation of Human Tissue Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation,
Business Opportunities and Technology of the House Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (statement of S. Randolph May, National Head of Tissue Services, American
Red Cross).
13the Class III medical device classication and their inclusion in the provisions
of the new legislation.34
The 1993 hearing was an important follow-up to the groundbreaking
1992 hearing, and the witness testimony from the key agencies revealed both
signicant consistency of opinion from each agency as well as productive new
thoughts and suggestions about how successful legislation might be tailored.
Senator Simon and Representative Wyden responded not long thereafter.
The Human Tissue for Transplantation Act of 1993
On November 19, 1993, Senator Simon introduced Senate Bill 170235
in the Senate. On the same day, Representative Wyden introduced substantially
identical legislation in the House, House Bill 3547.36 The bill in both houses
was called the \Human Tissue for Transplantation Act of 1993." Ultimately the
bill would pass in neither house, but a survey of its content sheds some light on
the historical development of regulation attempts.37
The rst important dierence between this new proposal and the Hu-
man Tissue Transplantation Act of 1992 was that the 1992 legislation proposed
to amend the Public Health Service Act, while the 1993 bill proposed to amend
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. This likely indicated a more direct charge
to FDA to carry out the regulation than was present in the 1992 bill.
House Bill 3547 diered from the 1992 bill in signicant substantive
34See Regulation of Human Tissue Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation,
Business Opportunities and Technology of the House Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (statement of D. Ted Eastlund, President, American Association of Tissue
Banks).
35S. 1702, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
36H.R. 3547, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
37For simplicity's sake, citations will be to H.R. 3547 alone, since both it and S. 1702 were
substantially identical.
14ways as well. It furnished basic denitions, including ones for \tissue," \banked
human tissue," and \human tissue bank."38 It created authority for the FDA to
require tissue screening, donor testing, and record-keeping and mandated FDA
establishment of \good tissue banking practice."39 New labeling and advertis-
ing requirements were authorized, as well as implementation of a tissue bank
registration and licensing scheme.
To tap the insight and experience of the private sector, House Bill 3547
directed establishment of a national \Tissue Advisory Committee" whose func-
tions would include advising the Secretary on appropriate standards of quality
and handling for various tissue types, reporting on new technological develop-
ments in the industry, and assisting in establishing a system of investigating
consumer complaints.
As for enforcement, the full range of options available for drugs and
devices would be made available for tissues as well, including civil penalties,
criminal prosecution and seizures.40 Funding of House Bill 3547's scheme was
to be derived from user fees collected from each tissue bank as a condition of its
registration.41 Finally, the bill would have nullied the infamous 1991 NAFR
subjecting human heart valve allografts to premarket approval.42
The 1993 legislation was a more sophisticated attempt to produce new
federal tissue regulation than its predecessor, and its authors clearly beneted
from and incorporated many of the ideas and suggestions advanced at the in-
38H.R. 3547, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. x 3 (1993).
39Id. x 4.
40See id. x 5.
41See id. x 6.
42Id. x7.
15tervening hearings. Notwithstanding their failure to pass into law, the bills and
their attendant hearings eectively focused industry and ocial interest and
rmly planted the tissue regulation question on the government's agenda. Re-
sponding to and harnessing this heightened interest level, the FDA took action,
less than two months after the introduction of Senate Bill 1702 and House Bill
3547.
The Interim Rule Governing Human Tissue Intended for Trans-
plantation
On December 14, 1993, the FDA issued an interim rule to address the
public health concerns associated with tissue donation and transplantation.43
This rule remains the most current government regulatory eort. Legal author-
ity to create and enforce the regulation was drawn from section 361 of the Public
Health Service Act: \[The Secretary] is authorized to make and enforce such
regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the spread of commu-
nicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from
one State or possession into any other State or possession."44 The authority to
impose various enforcement options for violations of PHSA section 361 is found
in section 368 and includes civil penalties and/or imprisonment of up to one
year.45
Given the gravity of the public health risk involved, the FDA bypassed
normal notice and comment procedures for this regulation, deeming them \con-
trary to the public interest." The agency found no acceptable excuse for failure
4358 Fed. Reg. 65514 (1993) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1270).
4442 U.S.C.S. x 264 (1996).
45Id. x 271.
16to perform the basic requirements of the rule, and hence elected to make them
nal and eective immediately.46
The FDA's justication for the interim rule was \the immediate need
to protect the public health from the transmission of HIV infection and hep-
atitis infection through transplantation of tissue from donors infected with or
at risk of these diseases."47 The Federal Register notice accompanying the rule
emphasized that it was not meant to be a permanent or even long-term regula-
tory program, but that FDA intended to propose more extensive and permanent
regulation in the near future. Nevertheless, as the current law in the area, the
rule and its provisions merit careful description.48
:
Scope
The interim rule applies generally to anyone engaged in recovery, process-
ing, or distribution of banked human tissue. Banked human tissue is dened as
human tissue derived from one person intended for implantation into another,
which has been handled and treated in ways not intended to alter its struc-
ture or functional characteristics. Any tissues treated only in ways to prevent
transmission of disease are covered by the rule.49
There are several signicant categories of tissues, however, that are not af-
46See 58 Fed. Reg. 65514, supra note 43, at 65518.
47See 58 Fed. Reg. 65514, supra note 43, at 65516.
48Citations in the description will be to the interim rule itself as it appears in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
49See 21 C.F.R. xx 1270.1, 1270.3 (1996).
17fected by the interim rule. These include any tissues already regulated as drugs,
biological products, or medical devices; vascularized organs; semen and other
reproductive tissue; human milk; and bone marrow. Heart valve allografts, for
example, since already regulated by FDA as a Class III medical devices, are
not subject to the regulation. At bottom, then, tissues like bone, ligaments,
tendons, cartilage, corneas, and skin whose structure is unchanged are those
that are covered.50
:
Testing
The regulation mandates a battery of laboratory tests on the blood sample of
any potential donor in order to prevent disease transmission. The tests include:
HIV-1 antibody, HIV-2 antibody, hepatitis B surface antigen, and hepatitis C
virus antibody.51 These are the only mandatory laboratory tests imposed by the
statute and should be regarded as a regulatory oor. FDA noted that for certain
tissue types there may be other desirable tests, but that such tests would have
to be included in the subsequent permanent regulation and were inappropriate
for an interim rule.52
Further, the regulation requires that a process of determining suitable donors
be used. The process must include an inquiry into the potential donor's medical
50Id.
51See 21 C.F.R., supra note 49, x 1270.5.
52See 58 Fed. Reg. 65514, supra note 43, at 65517.
18history to determine if he has behaved so as to place himself in a high-risk cat-
egory for contraction of HIV or hepatitis. No particular questions are specied
as mandatory, however, as long as some sort of inquiry is conducted.53 Again,
the FDA suggested that a future rule might contain more precise instructions.
Quarantining of tissue is required for any tissue not accompanied by (1)
negative laboratory results for the required tests, or (2) medical history demon-
strating freedom from risk factors and other evidence of HIV or hepatitis infec-
tion.54
:
Written Procedures and Record-keeping
For both the disease testing process as well as the donor screening process,
written procedures must be prepared and followed for all steps. Any deviation
from these procedures must be documented and justied.55 A new record-
keeping system is also in operation, under which documentation is required of
(1) the results and interpretation of all tests performed on a particular tissue,
(2) the destruction or disposal of unsuitable tissue, and (3) the medical history
of the donor as revealed by the screening process.56 All such records must be
maintained for at least ten years, due to the potentially long interval between in-
53See supra note 51.
54Id.
55See 21 C.F.R., supra note 49, x 1270.7.
56See 21 C.F.R., supra note 49, x 1270.11.
19fection with HIV or hepatitis and manifestation of symptoms of either disease.57
:
Inspections and Enforcement
FDA inspection of tissue banking facilities is authorized, and covers the
physical facility as well as all equipment, products, and records. Questioning of
employees and handlers is also authorized. The inspections may be scheduled or
unscheduled, and are restricted in scope to identifying facilities failing to take
necessary precautions to prevent the spread of HIV and hepatitis.58
If an inspector nds a violation of any of the interim rule's requirements,
FDA is authorized to issue a written order mandating recall of the tissue and its
destruction or other retention until its safety is conrmed. Alternatively, FDA
may simply seize the violative tissue and destroy it. If a written order is issued,
the recipient may within ve days of receipt request a hearing on the matter.59
Putting the Interim Rule to Work
The FDA's interim rule was a tremendous symbolic step, but its skeletal
structure and deferral of several substantive issues to the \more permanent"
regulation to come leave many practical questions unanswered. Without more
57See 21 C.F.R., supra note 49, x 1270.9.
58See 21 C.F.R., supra note 49, x 1270.13.
59See 21 C.F.R., supra note 49, x 1270.15.
20particular guidance on exactly which tests must be run and which questions
must be asked when screening donors, one could easily argue that the \stan-
dards" imposed by the interim rule are really not standards at all. The variance
and complexity of scientic tests and blood collection algorithms available to
identify HIV infection guarantee non-uniformity of result accuracy. The range
of possible questions and interrogation techniques (written questionnaires, ver-
bal interviews) to determine whether a potential donor exhibits risk factors for
HIV or hepatitis infection similarly introduce a possibly dangerous element of
uncertainty.
The Centers for Disease Control and the FDA responded to these concerns
with a series of guidelines, workshops, and comment solicitations designed to aid
tissue banks in carrying out their obligations under the interim rule consistently,
safely, and eectively. Some were technical guidelines for proper tissue and blood
sample tests to help standardize laboratory practice, others were suggestions
about the most eective questions to ask in order to isolate risk-prone behavior
in donors.60 These eorts proved valuable to many in the industry, and helped
provide much-needed standardization of procedures used to ensure the viability
of donors and safety of donated tissue.
60See, e.g., FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Draft Discussion
Points for Screening and Testing Donors of Human Tissue Intended for Transplan-
tation and Human Reproductive Tissue, and for Establishment Registration (1995);
60 Fed. Reg. 27,406 (1995); FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research,
Draft Document Concerning the Screening and Testing of Donors of Human Tis-
sue Intended for Transplantation Prepared June 12, 1995 (1995).
21The interim rule has functioned reasonably well, as demonstrated by the ab-
sence since promulgation of any incident adversely aecting the public health at
anywhere near the level of the Norwood revelation of 1991. Notwithstanding this
success, a 1994 occurrence in California made it clear that weaknesses remained
in the interim rule, underscoring the persistent necessity of more permanent
government regulation of the eld.
The incident involved a quantity of bone imported from Russia into Cali-
fornia, much of which was inadequately screened. A wave of concern erupted
with this revelation, and though upon investigation the FDA identied no inci-
dence of disease directly traceable to the Russian bone, its questionable source
prompted the FDA to nevertheless order its destruction.61
That such a quantity of transplantable bone could slip through regulation
predictably touched o frustrated reactions and was cited by many as evidence
that the industry needs tougher controls.
A pathologist at one California hospital who received the Russian bone ex-
pressed shock at the lack of controls. "The assumption was that anyone in the
health-care industry is well-regulated, monitored and accredited," he told the
San Diego Union-Tribune. "To nd that there is a major segment that is not, is
astounding."62 Clearly there remained signicant pressure for more government
regulation and faster FDA fulllment of its promise to produce new, permanent
61See Rex Dalton, Half-Skeletons Target of Probe Here; San Diego Tissue Bank Distributed
Questionable Bones for Transplants, San Diego Union-Trib., Feb. 3, 1995, at A1.
62Id.
22regulations. This pressure has persisted to the present.
Recent Developments
Under strain from the medical community and the tissue banking industry,
the FDA has endeavored to demonstrate that it has not been sitting on its
hands. In a presentation to the AATB in September 1996, Mr. Steven Falter
(director of FDA's CBER Regulation and Policy Division) explained several
areas to be addressed in the nal rule.63
The nal rule will likely be a combination of expansion of the interim rule
and introduction of all-new regulations. Modications to the interim rule will
include: fteen new denitions for clarication; requirements for determining
donor suitability when next of kin cannot be contacted; better denition of
testing parameters (e.g., plasma dilution requirements); specication of par-
ties responsible for record retention; more precise record-keeping requirements;
identication protocols for facilities receiving or distributing tissues; adminis-
trative requirements for tissues oered for import; and exemption from routine
inspection for hospitals and other establishments whose activities are limited to
temporarily storing human tissues.64
63FDA Considers Modifying Tissue Banking Regulations; Comments from Industry Will
Be Encouraged, Transplant News, Sept. 17, 1996. (This is a secondary source for the
substance of Mr. Falter's speech; the author was unable to acquire a transcript of the speech
itself or of the AATB meeting; further, page numbers for Transplant News were unfortunately
unavailable on-line.)
64Id.
23New regulatory requirements, many of which have been suggested by other
agencies and the industry for quite some time, will likely include: annual reg-
istration of human tissue banks; creation and use of tissue tracking methods;
and reporting of errors, accidents, or any transmission of infectious disease via
human tissue. An interesting issue under consideration is an exemption for
urgent medical circumstances and the associated denition thereof. The FDA
is soliciting industry comment on which tissue types should be exempted and
under what circumstances.65
Other areas that new regulations might address are: requiring a six-month
quarantine for semen donors; providing guidance on appropriate disposition
of directed-donor cases66 where the donor exhibits risk factors for infection;
possible exemption for procedures where regulation would not enhance public
health (e.g., autologous tissue67 transplantation); and nally, determining which
transplantable substances should be treated as \human tissue" for regulatory
purposes and which should be treated as medical devices or biological drugs.68
This last concern would implicate the regulation of heart valve allografts, in
many ways the issue that started this whole process and which has yet to be
permanently decided.
65Id.
66When a tissue recipient species a particular donor from whom he wants the transplantable
tissue to be harvested.
67Human cells that are taken from a patient biopsy, grown in cell culture, and then reim-
planted into the same patient; this is distinguished from allogeneic tissue, which is from a
donor source.
68See FDA Considers Modifying Tissue Banking Regulations; Comments from Industry
Will Be Encouraged, supra note 63.
24The FDA's research and ongoing dialogue with the tissue banking industry
is noteworthy, but the all-important question of exactly when a new regulation
will be issued remains uncertain. Some have argued that Republicans' control of
Congress may delay further FDA action, since their agenda is not favorable to
broadening FDA's role. Any decrease in the FDA's already tight budget makes
the prospect of the agency's expanding regulation and enforcement obligations
all the more unlikely.
Try, Try Again: the Human Tissues Safety Act of 1996
Notwithstanding the uncertainty about when, if ever, the FDA might is-
sue its nal rule, Senator Simon, (now) Senator Wyden, and Senator Dodd
have continued in their eorts toward Congressional action. The three senators
co-sponsored Senate Bill 2195, the Human Tissues Safety Act of 1996,69 and
introduced it in the Senate on October 3 of that year.
In his introductory speech, Senator Wyden blasted the current FDA system:
[I] nd it shocking that FDA does not even have a list of the hundreds of
tissue banks in this country that process human tissue from cadavers. Without
such a list, FDA cannot send inspectors to these tissue banks to ensure that
they comply with the Agency's infectious disease screening requirements. We
should not wait until a child gets AIDS from infected tissue to empower FDA
to ensure compliance....70
He also asserted that FDA policy with respect to autologous and allogeneic
tissues was inconsistent with their respective risk levels. Requiring premarket
69S. 2195, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
70142 Cong. Rec. S12,309 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
25approval for some autologous tissues while essentially letting many allogeneic
tissues go unregulated was, in Senator Wyden's opinion, \an exercise of trying
to t square pegs in round holes."71 The FDA's policy of continuing to regulate
some tissues as medical devices also came under attack, as Senator Wyden
asserted that human tissues \are not drugs, biological products, or medical
devices, and ...it is inappropriate to regulate them as if they were."72 Since
human tissue is a nonproprietary substance, he argued, it is nancially dicult
for biotechnology companies to justify continued research when faced with the
requirement of premarket approval.73
Senate Bill 2195 proposes to address these problems by amending both the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act. First, it
explicitly includes reproductive tissue, demineralized bone, heart valves, dura
mater, and manipulated autologous cells in the denition of human tissue, while
also excluding all human tissue (as so dened) from classication as a drug,
biological product, or medical device.74 As discussed above, both heart valves
and dura mater are currently regulated by FDA as devices under the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976.
Registration in accordance with section 510 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act is a prerequisite under the bill for engaging in any recovery, processing,
71Id.
72Id.
73See id.
74S.2195, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. x 1(a) (1996).
26storage, or distribution of human tissue.75 Further, the bill authorizes (but does
not require) establishment by the Secretary of operating standards after notice
and opportunity for comment. Any operating standards so established must
be limited to infection control, processing practice, and labeling and record-
keeping.76
The bill also addresses advertising, and requires that any such promotional
materials must consist only of \accurate and balanced representations that are
consistent with sound scientic information...."77
Enforcement options under the bill are the most explicitly wide-ranging to
date. They include inspection authority, orders of recall and/or destruction
similar to those authorized by the interim rule, as well as the full range of
civil, criminal, and seizure options like those aorded by the Human Tissue for
Transplantation Act of 1993.
At the time this paper was completed, the most recent status of Senate Bill
2195 was that it had been read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources. No further action had been taken as of January
16, 1996.
Lessons and Prospects for the Future
75Id. x 1(b).
76Id.
77Id.
27In many ways the debate over regulation of human tissue is a classic case
of government having to decide how much regulation is enough. On the one
hand, government has an indisputable obligation to protect its citizens from un-
necessary health risk. From this standpoint the failure to establish permanent,
mandatory requirements for the most basic tests appears particularly egregious.
The FDA's interim rule has attempted to remedy this particular problem, but
as California residents could explain, the interim rule is only that - interim. It
does not and should not be expected to provide comprehensive protection for
tissue recipients. Its inadequacy, even its title, is a clear reminder that maxi-
mum safety will only be achieved through more permanent action, whether from
FDA or from Congress.
On the other hand, no government program is without its costs. Increased
enforcement and monitoring obligations would demand resources, and funding
would likely come from private industry in the form of user fees. Such fees are
likely to be passed on at least in part to the patient, and to the extent that
they are not, they could quell scientic progress and inhibit breakthroughs that
ironically may themselves lead to safer and less expensive treatment techniques.
This balancing of benets, risks, and attendant costs is an enormously dif-
cult one, particularly when the public health is at stake. The hearings, leg-
islative attempts, and agency action during the last six years have shown that
28government communication and cooperation with private industry is not only
feasible but desirable. The debate is much more informed now than it was way
back in 1991 after the Norwood tragedy. More importantly, although all parties
involved disagree on some details, they agree that governmental oversight is ap-
propriate to assure the public health in this area. Compromise will undoubtedly
be necessary to eect meaningful change, but the progress of the last several
years demonstrates that with continued perseverance and conscientious focus
on the paramount goal of safety, such change is well within reach.
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